We study convex risk measures describing the upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound, which is a subinterval of a no-arbitrage pricing bound. We call such a convex risk measure a good deal valuation and give a set of equivalent conditions for its existence in terms of market. A good deal valuation is characterized by several equivalent properties and in particular, we see that a convex risk measure is a good deal valuation only if it is given as a risk indifference price. An application to shortfall risk measure is given. In addition, we show that the no-free-lunch (NFL) condition is equivalent to the existence of a relevant convex risk measure which is a good deal valuation. The relevance turns out to be a condition for a good deal valuation to be reasonable. Further we investigate conditions under which any good deal valuation is relevant.
Introduction
The no-arbitrage framework in mathematical finance is not sufficient for providing a unique price for a given contingent claim in an incomplete market. Instead provided is only a no-arbitrage pricing bound. Since it is in general too wide to be useful in financial practice, needed is an alternative way to find nice candidates of prices of contingent claims. As a method to give a sharper pricing bound, the framework of no-good-deal has been discussed in much literature; for example, [ [25] . The no-arbitrage pricing bound for a claim is obtained by excluding prices which enable either a seller or buyer to enjoy an arbitrage opportunity by trading the claim and selecting a suitable portfolio strategy. The price in a market should be consistent with this bound to make the market viable. On the other hand, an upper (resp. a lower) good deal bound may be interpreted as determined by the seller's (resp. the buyer's) attitude to the risk associated with the claim. This can be considered as a generalization of the both pricing principle of no-arbitrage and exponential utility indifference valuation. Denote by a(x) such an upper bound for a claim x. The functional a is supposed to have the following properties: for any claims x and y. In the second property, the inequality x ≤ y is in the almost sure sense, where we regard the claims as random variables. In the third, the element c ∈ R stands for a deterministic cash-flow. The last one represents the risk-aversion of the seller taking into account the impact of diversification. In brief, we suppose that ρ a defined as ρ a (x) := a(−x) is a normalized convex risk measure. If we impose additionally the positive homogeneity: a(λx) = λa(x) for all x and λ ≥ 0, which implies the subadditivity: a(x + y) ≤ a(x) + a(y) for all x and y, then ρ a becomes a coherent risk measure. By the same sort argument as above, a functional b which refers to a lower good deal bound is given by a normalized convex risk measure ρ b as b(x) = −ρ b (x) .
A good deal bound should be a subinterval of the no-arbitrage pricing bound, so not every convex risk measure yields a good deal bound. The aim of this paper is to characterize such a convex risk measure, which we call a good deal valuation (GDV hereafter); we define GDV as a normalized convex risk measure ρ with the Fatou property such that for any claim x, the value ρ(−x) lies in the no-arbitrage pricing bound of x. This definition of GDV is given from sellers' viewpoint; for a GDV ρ and a claim x, a(x) := ρ(−x) serves as an ask price of x. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that if ρ is a GDV, then b := −ρ gives bid prices. We impose the Fatou property as a natural continuity condition for good deal bounds.
First we investigate equivalent conditions for the existence of a GDV. Among others, we show that a GDV exists under a condition weaker than the no-arbitrage one, which means that there may be GDVs even if the underlying market admits an arbitrage opportunity. Further we study equivalent conditions for a given ρ to be a GDV. In particular, we see that any GDV is given as a risk indifference price. The concept of risk indifference price has been undertaken by [26] . There is much literature on this topic ( [14] [20] [23] among others). Some of the above papers observe that a risk indifference price provides a good deal bound. Our assertion is that its reverse implication also holds true, which seems a new insight.
As mentioned before, GDV may exist even in markets with free lunch. We observe the equivalence between the no-free-lunch condition (NFL) and the existence of a relevant GDV, that is a relevant convex risk measure which is a GDV. This could be considered as a version of Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (FTAP). Moreover as a version of Extension Theorem, we see that the relevance of a GDV is equivalent to that the extended market by the GDV satisfies NFL. We see also that the relevance is equivalent to the no-near-arbitrage condition (NNA) introduced by [25] . We give an example (Example 4.9) which shows that NFL for the original market does not ensure NNA in general for a given GDV. We investigate conditions under which any GDV is relevant, and illustrate some examples related to this topic. Now we mention the preceding results on FTAP from the viewpoint of good deal bound. Kreps [21] introduced NFL and proved FTAP as well as Extension Theorem.Černý and Hodges [8] established the framework of good deal bound and gave a version of Extension Theorem. Jaschke and Küchler [17] showed that good deal bounds are essentially equivalent to coherent risk measures and gave a variant of FTAP. Staum [25] extended their results to the noncoherent case. Bion-Nadal [5] introduced a dynamic version and gave an associated FTAP. In [17] and [25] , an acceptance set reflecting an investor's preference is given first, and a convex risk measure induced by it is considered as a functional describing a good deal bound. Our approach is different, although we treat very similar problems. In our study, a convex risk measure is given first, and necessary and sufficient conditions for the given convex risk measure to be a GDV is discussed. This approach is in the same spirit as [5] . Our results provide a deeper understanding of a convex risk measure as a pricing functional in a market.
Although our framework appears to be static, an extension to the dynamic framework of [5] can be done in a straightforward manner. A detailed comparison with [25] and [5] will be given in Remarks 3.5, 4.4 and 4.7.
In Section 2, we describe our model and prepare notation. In particular, we introduce the definitions and some basic properties of superhedging cost and risk indifference price. Main results are given in Sections 3 and 4.
Preliminaries
Here we introduce our framework and several basic results.
The Orlicz space
Let (Ω, F , P) be a complete probability space. The Orlicz space L Ψ with Young function Ψ is defined as the set of the random variables X such that there exists c > 0,
Here we call Ψ : R → R ∪ {∞} a Young function if it is an even convex function with Ψ(0) = 0, Ψ(x) ↑ ∞ as x ↑ ∞ and Ψ(x) < ∞ for x in a neighborhood of 0. It is a Banach lattice with the gauge norm
and pointwise ordering in the almost sure sense. In the case of Ψ = Ψ ∞ :
In this paper we consider the set of the future cash-flows L to be either L Ψ or M Ψ with a fixed Young function Ψ. This specification would be justified by noting that L becomes a linear space of random variables with natural ordering and sufficiently abstract in that it incorporates L p spaces with 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. More importantly, a Young function Ψ may be connected to a utility function u as Ψ(x) = −u(−|x|)) and then L becomes a suitable space where expected utility maximization is considered (see e.g., [4] ). Note that the case of exponential utility is covered. Our treatment and results do not depend on a specific choice of Ψ. This generality is indeed necessary to derive a conclusion which does not depend on a specific choice of utility function. Let M ⊂ L be the set of the 0-attainable claims. Each element of M represents a future payoff which investors can super-replicate with 0 initial endowment. Simultaneously, M might be regarded as the set of strategies which investors can take. We suppose that M is a convex cone including L − , where we denote L + (resp. L − ):= {x ∈ L|x ≥ 0 (resp. ≤)}.
Let L * + be the set of all positive linear functionals on L. Remark that any element of L * + is continuous by the Namioka-Klee theorem (see [4] for an extended result). The both cases of L = L Ψ and L = M Ψ are treated in a unified way in the following. Let L † := L Ψ † , where Ψ † is the complimentary function of Ψ defined as
Define a set of probability measures P :
and Q e := {Q ∈ Q|Q ∼ P}. For Q ∈ P, denote by E Q the corresponding expectation operator. By Young's inequality:
for any x, y ∈ R and a, b > 0, the operation E Q enables us to identify P with a subset of L * + .
Convex risk measure
Here we collect several notions and results on convex risk measures which we utilize in this paper. A convex risk measure ρ is a (−∞, +∞]-valued functional on L satisfying properness: ρ(0) < ∞,
for any x, y ∈ L. A convex risk measure ρ is a coherent risk measure if it satisfies in addition, positive homogeneity: ρ(cx) = cρ(x) for any x ∈ L and any c > 0. 
A convex risk measure ρ is said to have the Fatou property if for any increasing sequence {x n } ⊂ L with x n ↑ x ∞ a.s., ρ(−x n ) ↑ ρ(−x ∞ ). Denote by R the set of all convex risk measures with ρ(0) = 0 and the Fatou property.
Theorem 2.2 (Biagini and Frittelli [4])
For ρ ∈ R, we have for x ∈ L,
Remark 2.3
In the case of L = M Ψ , it is known that L † coincides with the dual of L and the supremum in (2.1) is attained. Moreover, every finite convex risk measure has the Fatou property. See [4] for the detail. The finiteness condition cannot be dropped as we see in Example 2.7 below. If Ψ satisfies the ∆ 2 condition: there exist t 0 > 0 and K > 0 such that
A convex risk measure ρ is said to have the Lebesgue property if for any sequence {x n } ⊂ L with sup n x n ∞ < ∞ and x n → x ∞ a.s., it holds that ρ(x n ) → ρ(x ∞ ) as n → ∞. Here · ∞ refers to the L ∞ norm. This definition was introduced in [18] for the L = L ∞ case. Since any continuous linear functional on L can be decomposed into the sum of an element of L † ⊂ L 1 and a purely finitely additive signed measure (see [23] ), the same argument as the proof of Theorem 2.4 in [18] can apply to have the following result with the aid of Theorem 2.1 above.
Theorem 2.4
For a finite convex risk measure ρ, the following are equivalent:
1. ρ has the Lebesgue property.
for any α > 0 and a sequence of measurable sets A n with P(
3. for any c > 0, the set {g ∈ L * + ; ρ * (g) ≤ c} is a uniformly integrable subset of L † and for any x ∈ L, it holds that
Note that the Fatou property follows from the Lebesgue property by (2.2).
A convex risk measure is said to be relevant if ρ(−z) > 0 for any z ∈ L + \ {0}.
The relevance was introduced in [12] as a condition for coherent risk measures with the Fatou property to be represented as (2.1) with a set of equivalent probability measures instead of P.
Superhedging cost
Here we discuss superhedging cost. Define a functional ρ 0 on L as
Since ρ 0 (−x) represents the superhedging cost for a claim x, it gives the upper no-arbitrage pricing bound for x. In fact if a seller could sell x with a price greater than ρ 0 (−x), then she could enjoy an arbitrage opportunity by taking a suitable strategy from M. By the same reasoning the lower no-arbitrage pricing bound for x is given by −ρ 0 (x). 
. This is a contradiction, 
This means L * ∅, which is a contradiction. Now, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may suppose that
which implies that ρ 0 (x) ≤ −N, and so ρ 0 (x) = −∞.
Now we see that ρ 0 is a coherent risk measure and calculate (ρ 0 ) * . The convexity and positive homogeneity of ρ 0 follow from the assumption that M is a convex cone. The monotonicity and cash-invariance are obvious. The fact that ρ 0 (0) ≤ 0 implies that (ρ 0 ) * (g) ≥ 0 for any g ∈ L * + . On the other hand, for any ε > 0 and x ∈ L, we can find
We therefore have (ρ 0 )
For later use, we define for x ∈ L,
By definition ρ 0 is a coherent risk measure on L belonging to R if Q ∅.
Lemma 2.6 If
Moreover if Q e ∅, then ρ 0 is relevant.
Proof.
For any x ∈ L and ε > 0, there exists m ∈ M such that ρ 0 (x) + ε + m + x ≥ 0. Then we have E Q [−x] ≤ ρ 0 (x) + ε for any Q ∈ Q. Since Q ∈ Q and ε > 0 are arbitrary, we have ρ 0 (x) ≤ ρ 0 (x). It suffices then to observe that
The relevance under Q e ∅ is shown by noting that
In fact if there exists
, then we have a contradiction since for any Q 0 ∈ Q e , λQ 0
The following example shows that ρ 0 does not necessarily coincides with ρ 0 , so is not always represented as (2.1) even though Q is not empty.
Example 2.7
Let L = L p with p ∈ [1, ∞) and take the following set as M:
where Q 0 ∈ P is arbitrarily fixed. Any element of M is bounded from above. Therefore by the definition of ρ 0 , we have ρ 0 (−z) = ∞ for z ∈ L + which is not bounded from above. It is clear that Q 0 ∈ Q, so that L * ∅. Therefore ρ 0 is a coherent risk measure by Lemma 2.5. Moreover Q = {Q 0 } since for any Q ∈ Q, we have
for any z ∈ L + , which implies that Q = Q 0 . Therefore ρ 0 cannot be represented as (2.1).
In fact we can prove that ρ 0 does not have the Fatou property. Let z ∈ L + be unbounded from above. Consider the increasing sequence
Risk indifference prices
Here we recall risk indifference price. Given a convex risk measure ρ, define 
If I(ρ) ∈ R in addition, then Q ∅ and
Proof.
Since ρ(0) < ∞ and 0 ∈ M, we have I(ρ)(0) = 0 or −∞ depending on whether inf m∈M ρ(m) is finite or −∞. Therefore if I(ρ) > −∞ then inf m∈M ρ(m) is finite and I(ρ)(x) = inf m∈M ρ(x + m) − inf m∈M ρ(m) = inf m∈Mρ (x + m). From this the cash-invariance and monotonicity of I(ρ) are obvious. The convexity follows from that M is convex. Since M is a cone, we have
By Theorem 2.2, we have (2.5) if I(ρ) ∈ R and in particular, Q ∅.
Good deal valuations
In this section we discuss conditions under which a convex risk measure yields a good deal bound. A good deal bound should be a subinterval of the no-arbitrage pricing bound. We therefore introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.1 A convex risk measure ρ ∈ R is said to be a good deal valuation (GDV) if
As mentioned in Introduction, the above definition is given from seller's viewpoint. Nevertheless, (3.1) is equivalent to
which is from buyer's viewpoint. In addition, −ρ(x) ≤ ρ(−x) for any x ∈ L because ρ(x) + ρ(−x) ≥ 2ρ(0) = 0 by the convexity. For a GDV ρ, a good deal bound may be constructed as [−ρ(x), ρ(−x)], which is a subinterval of [−ρ 0 (x), ρ 0 (−x)]. Note that the upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound may be described by different GDVs.
Existence of good deal valuations
Here we present a set of equivalent conditions for the existence of a GDV.
Denote by M the closure of M in σ(L, L † ).
Theorem 3.2
The following are equivalent:
2. There exists a GDV.
Proof.
1⇒2: This is from Lemma 2.6. 2⇒1: Let ρ be a GDV.
Then the cone property of M implies that ρ * (Q) = +∞ for any Q ∈ P\Q. If Q is empty, then ρ equals to −∞ identically by (2.1), which contradicts ρ ∈ R. 
Condition 3 in the above theorem is weaker than the no-arbitrage condition. This means that a GDV may exist even if there is an arbitrage opportunity.
The following example shows that we cannot replace M with M in Conditions 3 and 4.
Example 3.3
We take the Lebesgue measure space on (0, 1] as the underlying probability space (Ω, F , P). Let u be the random variable given by u(ω) := ω, and M be given by {cu|c ≥ 0} − L + . We can see several interesting facts on this example as follows:
1. We consider the following two conditions:
This example satisfies (b), but does not satisfy (a). Replacing M by M, the two conditions become equivalent by Theorem 3.2.
2. Since 1 M, we have ρ 0 (0) = 0. Therefore if we take L = L ∞ , then ρ 0 is a finite coherent risk measure. In fact for any
Note that for x(ω) := log ω, we have ρ 0 (−x) = −∞.
3. Notice that Q is empty despite that the above Condition (b) holds. We therefore need to take the closure of M in Condition 4 of Theorem 3.2.
In fact, considering the sequence m n := (nu) ∧ 1, m n converges to 1, and so this example does not satisfy Conditions 3 nor 4.
Equivalent conditions for good deal valuations
Here we present conditions for a given ρ to be a GDV. The main contribution of the following theorem, is to show the equivalence between GDVs and risk indifference prices.
Theorem 3.4
For any ρ ∈ R, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. ρ is a GDV.
ρ(−m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M.
3. There exists a function c : Q → R such that for any x ∈ L,
4. There exists η ∈ R such that ρ = I(η).
, that is, ρ is a fixed point of I.
6. {ρ 0 ≤ 0} ⊂ {ρ ≤ 0}.
7. Q ⊃ {Q ∈ P|ρ * (Q) < +∞}. 
There exists a convex set
Since M is a cone, we have ρ * (Q) = ∞ for any Q ∈ P \ Q. 7⇒3: This is from Theorem 2.2. 3⇒4 ′ and 4: Since ρ ∈ R, we have
for any m ∈ M. Then, by the convexity, we have ρ(m) + ρ(−m) ≥ 2ρ(0) = 0 and so, inf m∈M ρ(m) = 0. Therefore,
and
4⇒5: By Lemma 2.8, ρ = I(η) is represented as
Since ρ(0) = 0, we haveη * (Q) ≥ 0. Therefore,
for all x ∈ L. It suffices then to recall that ρ(x) + ρ(−x) ≥ 2ρ(0) = 0 by the convexity.
5⇒1: This is from Lemma 2.6. 3⇒6: For any x ∈ {ρ 0 ≤ 0}, Lemma 2.6 implies that sup Q∈Q E Q [−x] = ρ 0 (x) ≤ 0. We have then
6⇒2: This is because ρ 0 (−m) ≤ 0 by definition. 4 ′ ⇒8: Taking A = {ρ ≤ 0} and noting that inf m∈M ρ(m) = 0, we have
8⇒2: This is obvious.
Remark 3.5
Denote by ρ A the RHS of (3.4). In [17] and [25] , the set A is given as an acceptance set and ρ A is considered as a functional describing a good deal bound. Therefore they appear to treat a special class of convex risk measures but Theorem 3.4 shows that it is the only class giving good deal bounds. The representation of GDV as ρ A is important in that it implies robustness of GDV to quantitative specification of investor's risk preference. Notice however that ρ A is not necessarily normalized. As long as treating ρ A , the condition defining GDV is equivalent to the no-cashout condition (NC) introduced in [25] :
that is, the upper estimate for ρ A (−x) holds automatically. The convexity of ρ A implies that NC is equivalent to ρ A (0) = 0. Theorem 6.1(0th FTAP) of [25] states, in a more abstract setting, a condition under which ρ A (0) = 0.
As mentioned in Introduction, many papers ( [14] , [20] , [23] , [26] ,...) treated risk indifference prices and some of them showed that a risk indifference price yields a good deal bound. On the other hand, Theorem 3.4 showed that a GDV is always a risk indifference price. It therefore supports the use of the operator I in constructing a good deal bound. We utilized however that a GDV has the Fatou property by definition. It should be noted that I(ρ) does not necessarily have the Fatou property even if ρ ∈ R. In other words, the operation does not necessarily preserve the Fatou property (see Example 3.8 below). Now we remark that it preserves the Lebesgue property that also could be regarded as a natural continuity requirement for good deal bounds as well as the Fatou property. Proof. By Theorem 2.4 and the existence of Q 0 ∈ Q such that ρ * (Q 0 ) < ∞, we have, for any x ∈ L and m ∈ M,
Therefore I(ρ) is (−∞, ∞]-valued by (2.4), and so it is a convex risk measure by Lemma 2.8. Since ρ is finite, so is I(ρ) by (2.4). Moreover for any m ∈ M,
we have
Therefore by Theorem 3.4, it only remains to show that I(ρ) has the Fatou property. By (2.2), it suffices to see that I(ρ) has the Lebesgue property. Note that I(ρ)(m) ≥ 0 for any m ∈ M by the convexity. For any α > 0, ǫ > 0 and a sequence of measurable sets A n with P(A n ) → 0, we have that
as n → ∞ by the Lebesgue property of ρ. Since ǫ is arbitrary, we conclude the Lebesgue property of I(ρ) by Theorem 2.4.
Proposition 3.7
1. ρ is a GDV with the Lebesgue property.
there exists a convex risk measure η with the Lebesgue property, ρ = I(η).

Proof.
1⇒2: This is because ρ = I(ρ) by Theorem 3.4. 2⇒1: By Lemma 2.8, we have inf m∈M η(m) ∈ R, and so
In particular we have (3.6) and (3.7) with η instead of ρ. By the finiteness of ρ = I(η), Theorem 2.4 can be applied to have the result.
, where P is a normal distribution on R. Let Q ∈ P have a compact support and define a sequence {Q n } ⊂ P by Q n (A) := Q(A − n) for A ∈ F , n ∈ N. Since {g ∈ L * + |g(1) = 1} is weak-* compact, there exists a cluster point µ of {Q n }. Since {Q n } is not tight, µ P.
, which contradicts that µ is a cluster point of Q n . By the same reason, we have also that for any
To see that I(ρ) does not have the Fatou property, consider the increasing sequence x n := 1 (−∞,n) . Then I(ρ)(−x n ) = 0 while I(ρ)(−x ∞ ) = 1.
Shortfall risk measures
Here we treat shortfall risk measure as an application. We presume an investor who sells a claim x. When she sells x with price c and selects m ∈ M as her strategy, her final cash-flow is c + m − x, and so its shortfall is (c + m − x) ∧ 0. In general, shortfall risk is defined as a weighted expectation of the shortfall with a loss function. A loss function is a continuous strictly increasing convex function l : R + → R + with l(0) = 0. This represents the seller's attitude towards risk. To suppress the shortfall risk less than a certain level δ > 0 which she can endure, the least price she can accept is given as
As shown in [1] and [16] , ρ l is a convex risk measure and it has the Fatou property under mild conditions. However, it is not a GDV as ρ l (0) 0: Proposition 3.9 Any shortfall risk measure is not a GDV.
Proof.
For any shortfall risk measure ρ l , (3.8) implies that
Hence, ρ l R, from which ρ l is not a GDV.
Now we show that a normalized shortfall risk measure can be a GDV. Define
In light of Theorem 3.4, it suffices to see I(
Relevant good deal valuations
Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
We have seen that the condition Q ∅ is equivalent to the existence of a GDV. Example 4.1 below shows that Q ∅ is not sufficient to rule out arbitrage opportunities in general. Kreps [21] showed that Q e ∅ is equivalent to NFL, that is, M ∩ L + = {0}. Here we prove that Q e ∅ is equivalent to the existence of a relevant GDV, that is, a relevant convex risk measure which is a GDV.
Proof.
1⇒2: By the relevance and Theorem 3.4, for any z ∈ L + \ {0}, there exists Q(z) ∈ Q such that E Q(z) [z] > ρ * (Q(z)). Therefore,
2⇒3: This is from Lemma 2.6. 3⇒1: For a given z ∈ L + \ {0}, let x = z. 1⇒4: This is because ρ separates M ρ and L + \ {0}. 4⇒1: If ρ is not relevant, then there exists z ∈ L + \ {0} such that ρ(−z) = 0.
In particular z ∈ M ρ , which is a contradiction. 
The relevance is clear from Theorem 2.2. The converse is the Halmos-Savage theorem (see e.g. [12] ).
Note that for Q ∈ P and ρ ∈ R, ρ * (Q) = 0 is equivalent to that −ρ(x) ≤ E Q [x] ≤ ρ(−x) for all x ∈ L. Therefore such Q is interpreted as a consistent pricing kernel of the extended market M ρ . The following example shows that the coherence in the second assertion of Proposition 4.5 cannot be dropped. In other words, there is no strictly positive consistent pricing kernel in general even if M ρ satisfies NFL: M ρ ∩ L + = {0}. 
Thus, ρ is a noncoherent relevant GDV. On the other hand, there is no q ∈ (0, 1) with c(Q) = 0. 
which is a different condition to M ρ ∩ L + = {0} unless ρ is coherent. This alternative definition of NFL enabled to establish the equivalence between NFL of ρ and the existence of Q 0 ∈ Q e with ρ * (Q 0 ) = 0 in [5] . In fact since cone(M ρ ) becomes a cone, the same argument as the proof of 2⇒1 of Theorem 4.2 can apply to have Q 0 ∈ Q e with E Q 0 [m] ≤ 0 for all m ∈ M ρ . Since x − ρ(−x) ∈ M ρ for all x ∈ L, we have ρ * (Q 0 ) = 0. Note however that cone(M ρ ) does not have any interpretation as the set of the 0-attainable claims in general. For instance, in the model of the preceding example, we can find x ∈ L with ρ(−x) ≤ 0 and λ > 0 satisfying ρ(−λx) > 0. Therefore, it seems not adequate, from economical point of view, to adapt such a definition of NFL. Consequently, the existence of Q 0 with ρ * (Q 0 ) = 0 may not be considered as a necessary condition for ρ to be a reasonable pricing functional.
When are all good deal valuations relevant?
As seen in Theorem 4.3, when we extend the underlying market M to M ρ by using a GDV ρ as pricing functional, the extended market M ρ remains to satisfy NFL if and only if ρ is relevant. Therefore markets in which any GDV is relevant are stable against such extensions of the market. Here we study necessary and (or) sufficient conditions under which all (coherent) GDVs are relevant.
Theorem 4.8
Suppose Q e ∅ and consider the following conditions:
Any coherent GDV is relevant.
Then, we have 1⇔2, 2⇒3, 3 ′ ⇒2, 3⇔4.
Proof.
1⇒2: Assume that there exists z 0 ∈ L + \ {0} such that ρ 0 (z 0 ) = 0. Then inf Q∈Q E Q [z 0 ] = 0, so that we can define ρ ∈ R as
This is a GDV by Theorem 3.4 but not relevant. In fact ρ(−z 0 ) = 0.
2⇒1: Let ρ be a GDV. Then by Item 5 of Theorem 3.4, ρ(−z) ≥ − ρ 0 (z) > 0 for any z ∈ L + \ {0}. 2⇒3: If Q Q e , then there exists Q * ∈ Q\Q e . Denoting A = {dQ * /dP > 0},
: By compactness we have for any z ∈ L + \ {0},
some convex set Q ⊂ Q = Q e . Therefore ρ is relevant. 4⇒3: If Q Q e then we can take Q * and A in the same way as "2⇒3". Let
The implications "3⇒3 ′ ", "3⇒1 (or 2)" and "2⇒3 ′ " in Theorem 4.8 do not hold in general. We illustrate counterexamples.
Example 4.9
We give an example satisfying Item 3 of Theorem 4.8 which does not satisfy Items 1 nor 3 ′ . Set Ω = R, L = L ∞ and P(du) = φ(u)du, where φ(u) is the standard normal density. We consider the set of the mixed normal distributions. Let V be the set of all probability measures on (0, ∞),
Note that all bounded odd functions are in M and Q ⊂ Q e ⊂ Q. Now we show that Q is σ(L 1 , L ∞ )-closed. Let {µ n } ⊂ V be a sequence with Q µ n → Q in σ(L 1 , L ∞ ). Denote y w (u) := e iwu for any w, u ∈ R, where i = √ −1. We have However, x − α ∈ M and E Q * [x − α] > 0, which contradicts Q * ∈ Q. On the other hand, Q is not compact. In fact for the sequence µ n := δ 1/n for n ∈ N, where δ u is the Delta measure concentrated on {u}, {Q µ n } does not have a cluster point in Q.
Finally, we construct a GDV ρ which is not relevant. We conclude the paper with one more example, which is a simple model taking transaction cost into account. In the following example, a model satisfying Item 3 ′ of Theorem 4.8 is constructed.
Example 4.11
Let Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 , . . . , ω n } and the Arrow-Debreu securities for the n states ω 1 , . . . ω n be tradable in a market subject to bid-ask spread.
Denote by a 1, j , a −1, j the ask and bid prices for the state ω j respectively for each j = 1, . . . , n. This set is compact because the set of (λ d ) is a finite dimensional simplex.
If j a 1, j < 1 in addition, then Q = Q e and so, Item 3 ′ of Theorem 4.8 is satisfied. Consequently, any GDV in this market is relevant. Remark that j a 1, j < 1 is a condition which requires market makers not to offer a set of prices which leads an apparent arbitrage opportunity for themselves.
